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NOTES AND COMMENTS
time in question he actually suspects a defense against the instrument
or he has reason to know that it exists by the observance of the reason-
able commercial standards in any business in which he may be en-
gaged . ' 3 4  This would give the terms "good faith" and "notice" an
"actual good faith test" when applied to laymen, but an "objective test"
would be used when applied to business men.35
Prospectively, it may be many years before all the states will adopt
the U. C. C. and the sections in point 36  One thing is certain. If it
is adopted by the states, the primary objective of developing uniformity
in the law of bills and notes will have a better chance for accomplish-
ment in respect to purchasers of negotiable paper than under the N. I. L.
as nearly every purchaser would be held to an objective standard of
care.
CHARLES E. NICHOLS.
Constitutional Law-Deprivation of Due Process-
Captive Audience
The Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia dis-
missed its investigation' concerning the use of radios in the vehicles
of Capital Transit Company,2 and petitions of appeal were denied by
the district court on the ground that no legal right of petitioning pas-
sengers had been impaired. In reversing,3 the court of appeals held
that forced listening- to radio commercials resulted from government
action 5 and deprived a "captive audience" of liberty without due process
"The "objective test" as to business men under the U. C. C. and the sub-
mitted language above would result in a different application for each business
field. The courts would probably find trouble in determining (or in framing
questions for the jury) what activities are necessary to constitute being in busi-
ness, whether a certain person is engaged in such a business, and what are the
reasonable commercial standards in this particular type business. Those drafting
the U. C. C. evidently thought the beneficial result would outweigh the difficulty.
' See note 29 supra.
"It took some 28 years for all the states to adopt the N. I. L. The U. C. C.
was introduced in the New York Legislature in 1952 but no action was taken ex-
cept to have it printed and circulated for the information of the bar and other
interested parties. The code will be introduced there again next year.
I Capital Transit Co., 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122 (1950).
'"If they can hear-they can hear your commercial 1" (from brochure by
Transit Radio, Inc., 1949).
'Pollak et at. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450 (D. C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 77 (1951).
" Forced hearing would seem to be more accurate.
'The Fifth Amendment "relates only to governmental action, federal in char-
acter, not to action by private persons." National Fed. Rwy. Workers v. National
Med. Bd., 110 F. 2d 529, 537 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 628 (1940).
"But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in
part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private
persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government
itself." American Communications Ass'n., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 401
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of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.6
This decision interpreted the word "liberty" to include "freedom of
attention," which interpretation, while not entirely novel, 7 seems to be
broader than any announced previously by an important court.8 The
first of the really liberal Supreme Court proclamations in point was set
forth in Allgeyer v.. Louisiana, which declared that as mentioned in the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty "means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person" but also the
privilege (among others) "to be free in the enjoyment of all his fac-
ulties." More recently, it has been held in a "sound truck" case that
"the right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach
the minds of willing listeners ... ."1o [Italics supplied.] There are
numerous other cases recognizing limitations upon the warranties of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments" but especially pertinent in respect
of the conflict presented in the principal case' 2 is Valentine v. Chresten-
(1950). See also Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Steele v. L. & N. R.R.,
323 U. S. 192, 208 (1944) : "Congress, through the Railway Labor Act, has con-
ferred upon the union selected by a majority of a craft or class of railway work-
ers the power to represent the entire craft or class in all colleotive bargaining
matters. While such a union is essentially a private organization, its power to
represent and bind all members of a class or craft is derived solely from Con-
gress. The Act contains no language which directs the manner in which the
bargaining representaive shall perform its duties. But it cannot be assumed that
Congress meant to authorize the representative to act so as to ignore rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise the Act would bear the stigma of
unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amedment in this respect."
6 See Shipley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio, 11 FED. CoMMAT.
B. J. 150 (1950).
' See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
O"No occasion had arisen till now to give effect to freedom from forced
listening as a constitutional right. Short of imprisonment, the only way to compel
a man's attention for many minutes is to bombard him with sound that he cannot
ignore in a place where he must be." Pollak et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n
of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450, 456 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
0 165 U. S. 578, 589 (1897). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U. S. 233, 244 (1936).
"0Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 87 (1949). "Surely there is not a con-
stitutional right to force unwilling people to listen." Saia v. New York, 334
U. S. 558, 563 (1948) (dissenting opinion). But see N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery
Ward, 157 F. 2d 486, 499 (8th Cir. 1946) : "The First Amendment is concerned
with the freedom of thought and expression of the speaker or writer, not with
the conditions under which the auditor or listener receives the message. One
need not, as a condition precedent to his right of free speech under the First
Amendment, secure permission of his auditor. The First Amendment does not
purport to protect the right of privacy, nor does it require that the audience shall
have volunteered to listen." For examples of protection under the law of nuisance
see Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251 (1922),
247 Mass. 60, 141 N. E. 569 (1923) ; and Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md.
348, 59 A. 2d 656 (1948).
"E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U. S. 569 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ; and Froh-
werk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919).12 I.e., the conflict between the protections afforded by the First and Fifth
Amendments. "Freedom of speech does not import the right or license to say
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sen,1 3 which held, in effect, that the guarantee of freedom to com-
municate information does not protect purely commercial advertising.
1 4
It is also worthy of note that Justice Jackson has refused to recognize
as a free speech issue the question of whether the use of amplifying
appliances may be regulated, contending that the right comprehends only
natural facilities for speech. 15
The Pollak opinion (principal case) states that the profits involved 1
and the interest of willing hearers17 cannot justify abrogating the con-
stitutional rights of even a minority.' 8 This might seem to raise an
interesting problem of degree when, for example, only one passenger
insists upon his right to "freedom of attention" while thirty others
are bent upon their "right to hear" (and such a consideration was appar-
ently the real basis for the Utilities Commission's decision to dismiss
its investigation). But it is submitted that the court's rationalization
is correct if the "captive audience"'1 was in fact captive as a result
of government action,20 since Capital Transit was under no compulsion
to provide radios for its customers.
One collateral repercussion of the decision followed closely on its
heels. In Harnik v. Levine a municipal court, discussing the complaint
whatever one pleases, to whom he pleases, and wherever he pleases. This is be-
cause the right of free speech is ony one of many rights accorded the people and
in our scheme of government it is intended that each shall be exercised with re-
gard to the others and that all are to be exercised under restraints imposed by
law." Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F. 2d 860, 865 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U. S. 693 (1926).
23316 U. S. 52 (1942).
" "This decision applies to 'commercials' and to 'announcements.' We are not
now called upon to decide whether occasional broadcasts of music alone would
infringe constitutional rights." Pollak, et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C.,
191 F. 2d 450, 458 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
" "Lockport has in no way denied or restricted the free use, even in its park,
of all of the facilities for speech with which nature has endowed the appellant."
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 568 (1948) (dissenting opinion). Justice
Frankfurter notes that "modern devices for amplifying the range and volume of
the voice, or its recording, afford easy, too easy, opportunities for aural aggres-
sion." Id. at 563 (dissenting opinion).
" There was no evidence in the principal case that profits were large enough
to have any effect on fares. A similar (abortive) attempt to "capture" the atten-
tion of Grand Central Station's daily throngs provoked several perceptive editorial
attacks. Of the argument that revenues provided by the sale of commercial time
helped defray station clean-up expenses, one editor said, in view of the fact that
Beech-Nut Gum was an advertiser: "In other words, the Voice of Grand Central
is urging five hundred thousand people a day to buy chewing gum so that the
management will have enough money to sweep up gum wrappers." 25 New
Yorker 11 (Dec. 31, 1949).
' 'Withdrawing this particular entertainment will no more deprive willing
hearers of liberty than excluding a man from a particular place imprisons him."
Pollak et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450, 457 n. 14 (D. C.
Cir. 1951).
""They suffer not only the discomfort of hearing what they dislike but a
sense of outrage at being compelled to hear whatever Transit and Radio choose."
Id. at 457.
" The transmitting station advertised it as a "guaranteed audience." THE
1949 RADIO ANNUAL, p. 363.
"' See note 5 supra.
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of an autoist "imprisoned" by double-parking, stated that "questions of
law, however new, strange, or unusual, are matters for judicial determi-
nation. Embattled passengers of a transit company in our nation's
capital recently became tired of listening to commercial radio broadcasts
while traveling in public conveyances; the [court] did not hesitate to
uphold the right of the public to be free from bombardment of sound
which could not be ignored.... If a 'captive audience' has a right to
complain of its plight and to pray for relief, so also may a 'captive
motorist.' "21 Such an observation would appear to ignore the requisite
of government action, either state or federal.
22
The problem analogous to the one in the principal case was presented
in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.23  In that case the conviction of eight
Jehovah's Witnesses under an ordinance requiring licenses for persons
soliciting orders was reversed, and the ordinance declared violative of
freedom of press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion-which
freedom were said to be in a "preferred position." 24  Justice Jackson
dissented vigorously, however, and cited the nature of the "Watch
Tower Campaign" which had been instituted in the city concerned and
which in certain respects resembled the Pollak situation.25 He reasoned
that "for a stranger to corner a man in his home, summon him to the
door and put him in the position either of arguing his religion or of
ordering one of unknown disposition to leave is a questionable use of
religious freedom. '12 6  And a similar case 27 arising in 1951 found only
a minority adhering to the "preferred position philosophy" while the
majority adopted the views of the former dissenters. Thus one more
nail has been driven in the coffin of constitutional absolutism, as applied
to the First Amendment.
Interesting analogies are also afforded in the areas of labor rela-
tions, 28 wiretapping,20 and undesired publicity.30 In the latter two re-
-' 106 N. Y. S. 2d 460, 462 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1951). The decision was not
on this basis." "The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution are designed
to protect the individual from invasion of his rights, privileges and immunities
by the federal and the State governments respectively." Schatte v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators, 70 F.
Supp. 1008, 1010 (S. D. Cal. 1947), aff'd mer., 165 F. 2d 216 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 334 U. S. 812 (1948).
319 U. S. 105 (1943).
2"Id. at 115.
2 "God's faithful servants go from house to house to bring the message of
the kingdom to those who reside there, omitting none. . . . They do not loot
nor break into the houses, but they set up their phonographs before the doors and
windows and send the message of the kingdom right into the houses into the
ears of those who might wish to hear; and while those desiring to hear are hear-
ing, some of the 'sourpusses' are compelled to hear," Id. at 172 (dissenting
opinion, quoting from J. F. Rutherford's RELIGION).
281d at 181 (dissenting opinion).
SBreard v. Alexandria, La., 341 U. S. 622 (1951).
28 See Note, 25 N. C. L. Rv. 216 (1947).
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liance is usually placed upon the so-called "right of privacy"3' 1 or "right
to be let alone."
3 2
The conflict is not a new one. Heraclitus of Ephesus wrote, in 500
B.C.: "The major problem of human society is to combine that degree
of liberty without which law is tyranny with that degree of law without
which liberty becomes license."3 3  The Pollak case demonstrates once
more the interpretive pliability of our Constitution in dealing with that
problem-whatever the setting. The Bill of Rights "can keep up with
anything an advertising man or an electronics engineer can think of."3 4
L. K. FuRGusON, JR.
Criminal Law-Pleas and Defenses-Nolo Contendere
Answers to a recent inquiry directed to many of the solicitors and
judges of North Carolina reveal an astonishing variety of opinions as
to the significance of the plea of nolo contendere. 1 There are almost
"See Zeni, Wiretapping-The Right of Privacy versusr the Public Interest,
40 J. Calm. L. 476 (1949)."See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U. S. 711 (1940) ; and Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, Is S. W. 2d 972
(1929).
",The "right of privacy" has been defined as "the right to live one's life in
seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In
short, it is the right to be left alone." Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 228, 37
S. W. 2d 46, 47 (1931).
" Justice Jackson uses this phrase in his dissent in the Murdock case, supra
at 166.
" Quoted by Palmer in Liberty and Order: Conflict and Reconciliation, 32
A. B. A. J. 731, 732 (1946).
"' Pollak et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450, 456 (D. C.
Cir. 1951). In "determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a
new subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the
framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of govern-
ment they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the vicissi-
tudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the
instrument itself discloses." United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 316 (1941).
"In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution
we are expounding." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (U. S. 1819).
Addendum: The supreme court opinion reversing the court of appeals in the
Pollak case was handed down after this note went to press. 20 L. W. 4343, May
26, 1952.
1 In November, 1952, the editor of this REvIEw wrote fifty-five judges and
solicitors of the recorder's and superior courts and requested that they send the
REviEw a statement setting forth their opinion (without any research) as to the
significance, essential requirements, and effects of the plea nolo contendere as
used in North Carolina. We wish to express our appreciation to the twenty judges
and solicitors who replied to this request for their contribution to this note.
In these twenty replies, some fifty-nine or sixty different points of view were
expressed. The differences between some of the views are only shaded, but the
opinions on some points are diametrically opposed to the law as laid down by
the supreme court.
Some of the views which do not seem to have judicial sanction are as follows:
"I have never looked into the law but have depended upon a general impression";
"I am not guilty but cannot contend with the State"; the defendant "is. therefore.
admitting that the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction, although he is
rather weakly saying that he is not admitting he is guilty"; "the defendant says
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